BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/29/2016 9:48 AM

Articles
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER IN THE ERA OF
PATENT STARE DECISIS
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN† & ARTI K. RAI††
ABSTRACT
The elaborate adjudicatory proceedings set up by the America
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) have thrust the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) squarely into the patent-litigation process. The AIA
proceedings, conducted by the newly formed PTO Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB), are now a formidable competitor to district
court litigation. The executive branch has further enhanced PTO and
PTAB power by vigorously asserting the agency’s prerogatives with
respect to certain aspects of these proceedings. Despite the formality
of the AIA proceedings, the agency’s lawyers have steered clear of
asking for Chevron deference on legal issues decided in these
proceedings. Although the executive branch’s caution may reflect the
unusual institutional structure of the PTAB, PTAB decisionmaking
could be structured in a manner that should, under conventional
administrative law principles, merit Chevron deference. In all
likelihood, the chief roadblock to Chevron is not formal
administrative law but specific challenges within the patent regime.
Many judges on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
reviews all appeals from PTO decisions, have long been reluctant to
apply conventional administrative law. Perhaps more surprisingly, the
Supreme Court’s recent decisionmaking in the area has emphasized
its own earlier cases (including cases predating the Administrative
Procedure Act) and stare decisis over conventional administrative
law. Given potentially hostile courts, the costs of the PTO leadership

Copyright © 2016 Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai.
† Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
†† Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. We thank
participants in the 2016 Duke Law Journal’s “Intellectual Property Exceptionalism”
Administrative Law Symposium, in particular John Golden, Former PTAB Chief Judge James
Smith, Chris Walker, and Melissa Wasserman, for their very helpful comments. We are also
indebted to participants at the 2015 Stanford Law School “PTO and the Courts” conference, in
particular John Duffy and Mark Lemley. We thank Elliot Chen for excellent research
assistance.

BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1564

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/29/2016 9:48 AM

[Vol. 65:1563

expending the political capital necessary to embed the PTO more fully
into the administrative state may exceed the benefits. At best, in those
cases where stare decisis is not implicated or is on the agency’s side,
the PTO may be able to exercise indirect influence on the Court
through the Office of the Solicitor General.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, with considerable fanfare, Congress passed, and
1
President Obama signed, the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).
The AIA, considered by many to be the most significant change to
2
the patent system since the Patent Act of 1952, heeded the call of a
broad range of stakeholders to strengthen substantially the powers of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in reviewing the
3
validity of granted patents. The various post-grant review
proceedings set up by the AIA have proved quite popular. The PTO
(and, more specifically, its newly created Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB)) are now an important option for not only any actual

1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA].
2. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
3. Entities that had long endorsed post-grant review included the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA). See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Competition Perspectives on
How Procedures and Presumptions Affect Patent Quality, in TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 23–24 (2003); COMM. ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., BD. ON SCI., TECH., &
ECON. POLICY, POLICY & GLOB. AFFAIRS DIV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95–103 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED “A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY” 2 (2004).
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and potential patent defendants but also interested third parties.
Indeed, the PTAB now receives between one hundred and two
4
hundred petitions for invalidity per month. Numerous appeals from
final decisions are making their way to the Court of Appeals for the
5
Federal Circuit, and one case, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
6
LLC, has already reached the Supreme Court.
In this Article, we assess when, and how, the PTO and its lawyers
(both at the PTO and at the Department of Justice (DOJ)) have
chosen to exert administrative power, particularly relative to the
agency’s immediate reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. As we discuss, because the Federal Circuit was set up
by Congress in 1982 specifically to review all patent appeals, it has
long competed with the PTO for preeminence in patent law. The
complex power dynamic between the PTO and the Federal Circuit
has already been the subject of considerable scholarship, and the
creation of the PTAB adds an important new dimension. The
popularity of the PTAB also creates opportunities for power struggles
between the agency and certain district courts—most notably (or
notoriously) the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
7
Texas—that appear quite interested in attracting patent litigation.
We find that the executive branch has been relatively assertive in
certain respects but reticent in others. For example, the PTO has
aggressively asserted lack of judicial reviewability with respect to the
agency’s decisions to institute post-grant proceedings, and its final
decisions on validity have staked out considerable ground in parsing
the complex requirements of patent validity. But the PTO has not
structured its decisionmaking in a manner that would put it in the
strongest position to ask for Chevron deference on legal issues
decided through adjudication. Indeed, it has not in fact asked for such
deference.
In our view, a significant hurdle for the PTO is the Supreme
Court’s apparent decision to deprioritize administrative law in favor
of the stare decisis effect of the Court’s cases that predate the rise of
the modern administrative state. Accordingly, even though
4. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STATISTICS 2–3 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-10-31%20
PTAB.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5T9-DXM5].
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446).
7. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text; infra Part I.A.
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conventional administrative law doctrine might support the agency,
the likelihood that the Supreme Court would apply this doctrine is
too low to overcome costs associated with issuing the types of
decisions entitled to Chevron deference. At best, in those cases where
stare decisis is not implicated or is on the agency’s side, the PTO may
be able to exercise indirect influence on the Court through the Office
of the Solicitor General (SG).
Part I of this Article outlines the normative rationale for the
PTAB, introduces the key proceedings conducted by the PTAB, and
discusses mechanisms through which the PTAB has asserted power
relative to the district courts and the Federal Circuit. Part II discusses
the PTO’s failure to ask for Chevron deference for legal
determinations made in PTAB adjudications. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court’s apparent decision to emphasize the stare decisis
effect of its own prior patent decisions rather than administrative law.
Part IV outlines a cost-benefit analysis of a PTO decision to set up
and implement a “Chevron-ready” regime.
I. THE PTAB AND POWER ASSERTION
The AIA restructures many aspects of the patent system,
including the PTO. With respect to the PTO, the AIA’s most
important feature is the creation of novel proceedings to review
granted patents, with the review to be conducted by a new
8
adjudicatory body within the PTO, the PTAB.
Prior to enactment of the AIA, the major route for correcting
errors in the initial decision by the PTO to grant a patent was a
challenge to validity by the defendant after the patent owner brought
9
infringement litigation in district court. But several interrelated
arguments favor administrative review of validity over review in
Article III patent litigation. Perhaps most obviously, Article III

8. The next four paragraphs rely heavily on Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay
Kesan, Strategic Decisions by Parties in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2731002 [https://perma.cc/25WP-DSM5].
9. Pre-AIA mechanisms for adversarial administrative review of granted patents were
used infrequently and were plagued by delays. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER
PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 3 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6HWG-RC2C]
(stating that from November 29, 1999 through the abolition of such reexamination effective
September 30, 2012, fewer than two thousand requests were filed, and that they lasted an
average of 39.5 months).
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litigation is quite costly. The biennial economic survey of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) indicates
that, even for the lowest-stakes category of patent lawsuits (in which
less than $1 million was at risk), median litigation costs have risen
10
from $650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 2013. And for the higheststakes lawsuits (in which more than $25 million was at risk), median
litigation costs rose from $4.5 million to $5.5 million over the same
11
time period.
The high cost of litigation would be less problematic if these
great expenditures produced accurate interpretation and application
12
of the relevant facts and law. As standard economic accounts of
procedure have noted, the goal of procedure is the minimization of
13
litigation and error costs. But decisions reached in Article III patent
litigation may not be particularly accurate. Because patent law often
uses science-based proxies such as “ordinary skill in the art” to tackle
14
relevant legal and economic policy goals, the subject matter of
15
patent law can be highly complex. With the possible exception of

10. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34
(2013).
11. Id.
12. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that a single correct answer will always exist. The
subject of legal indeterminacy in particular has been the subject of extensive debate among legal
scholars. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 481–85 (1995). But
in patent law, as in other areas of law, some proportion of factual and legal questions will have
determinate answers. See id. at 485 (defining an “easy case” as “one in which ‘the facts . . . [of
the case] fit the core of the pertinent concept-words of the rule in question [with the result that]
the application of the rule is obvious and unproblematic’”).
13. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages,
39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (analyzing the behavioral effects of accurate damage calculations on
injurers and the injured); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of
Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (analyzing the social utility of marginal improvements in the
accuracy of liability determinations).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). Thus, for example, under the language of the patent statute,
securing a patent on an invention requires a showing that the patent would not have been
“obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. The economic intuition behind this
inquiry is that if the invention were scientifically or technically obvious to the average scientist
or engineer working in the field, it would arise even without the incentive of a patent. As the
Supreme Court has noted, applying the nonobviousness standard correctly requires, among
other things, that the decisionmaker understand what was contained in the existing relevant
scientific literature and how the invention differs from what was contained in the literature. See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14–19 (1966).
15. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–75 (2003) (discussing the technical
complexity often involved in applying patent law standards, which “has yielded some
questionable jurisprudence”).
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judges on the Federal Circuit, judges in the federal courts tend to be
generalists who may not have the epistemic orientation necessary to
tackle questions at the intersection of law, science, and economic
16
policy. Moreover, district courts have to contend with juries, who
may be even less equipped than federal judges to address complex
17
questions of law and science. By contrast, administrative patent
judges at the PTAB are required to be “persons of competent legal
18
knowledge and scientific ability.”
Another reason to favor low-cost administrative review, rather
than high-cost Article III review, is that patent plaintiffs and
defendants have asymmetric incentives. Asymmetric incentives to
litigate are built into patent doctrine by the 1971 Supreme Court case,
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
19
Foundation. Under Blonder-Tongue’s view of estoppel, a challenger
who successfully invalidates a patent eliminates the owner’s ability to
20
assert it against anyone. Because successful invalidation necessarily
benefits not only the challenger but also all others affected by the
patent, including the challenger’s own competitors, commentators
have persuasively argued that the challenger is providing a public
21
good. By contrast, the challenger who loses is uniquely estopped
from challenging the patent again. Although this public good type
22
disincentive may exist in the administrative context as well (and,
indeed, exists in certain PTAB proceedings as a consequence of
strong estoppel provisions established by Congress), the lower cost of

16. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4–6 (2010).
17. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1673 (2013).
18. AIA § 7, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
19. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
20. See id. at 350 (finding that a patent invalidity finding creates nonmutual defensive
collateral estoppel, so that a patent that is invalid against one party is invalid against the world).
21. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004) (noting the public good problem
and further arguing that disincentives to challenge may be created in certain situations involving
oligopolistic competition between licensees that all pay sales-based royalties to the patentee).
22. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 336. But see Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K.
Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95
GEO. L.J. 269, 323–28 (2007) (noting that administrative review that relied on Chevron
deference by the courts rather than estoppel against the patent challenger could substantially
reduce collective action problems).

BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE ERA OF PATENT STARE DECISIS

4/29/2016 9:48 AM

1569

the administrative proceeding reduces the monetary burden placed
on the challenger and thus the scale of the disincentive.
In 2011, these arguments in favor of robust administrative review
won the day in Congress. The AIA’s statutory language confers
considerable power to make patent validity determinations on the
23
PTO as a whole and on the PTAB in particular. The three key postgrant proceedings set up by the AIA are inter partes review (IPR),
which allows validity challenges based on novelty and
nonobviousness; covered business method review (CBMR), which
allows certain types of business method patents to be challenged on
any validity ground; and post-grant review (PGR), which allows a
challenge on any validity ground to patent applications filed after
24
March 16, 2013. Because PGR has only recently begun to apply to
granted patents, IPRs and CBMRs are currently the most salient
25
proceedings.
Each review proceeds in two steps. First, a three-judge panel of
the PTAB, generally selected with an eye to expertise in the area of
science or technology involved, decides whether the petition shows
either a “reasonable likelihood” that at least one challenged claim
26
would be invalid (in the case of an IPR) or that “it is more likely
than not” that at least one challenged claim would be invalid (in the
27
case of a CBMR). If the panel concludes that the petition meets the
relevant threshold, the panel institutes review. After institution of
review, the panel must generally make the final decision on the
28
patent’s validity within one year.
Although questions of infringement are still decided in the
courts, an invalidity finding in the context of PTAB proceedings
renders the infringement question moot. Moreover, if a PTAB panel
finds a patent claim valid, such a decision requires a prior legal
determination regarding the scope of the patent (so-called patent

23. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
24. AIA § 6(a) (providing for IPR); id. § 18 (providing for CBMR under the Transitional
Program for Covered Business Method Patents); id. § 6(d) (providing for PGR).
25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 4, at 3 (showing that three or
fewer PGR petitions were filed monthly).
26. AIA § 6(a), 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
27. Id. § 6(d), 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012).
28. Id. § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012).
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29

that should be relevant to judicial
“claim construction”)
30
infringement findings.
Both the PTO and the PTAB have embraced the power
conferred by Congress. In the remainder of this Part we discuss
administrative-power assertion relative to district courts as well as
power assertion relative to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Historically, the main power struggle has been between the
PTO and the Federal Circuit. In recent years, however, as many
commentators have observed, district courts appear to be competing
31
to attract patent litigation. The most notable (or notorious) example
is the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which
some argue has deliberately instituted overly plaintiff-friendly
32
procedures to attract patent disputes.
A. Power Relative to the District Courts
Statutory features that make the PTAB more attractive than
district courts for challenging patents have the effect of significantly
33
enhancing PTAB power. Perhaps most notably, from the standpoint
of a patent challenger, the AIA’s “preponderance of the evidence”
standard for invalidating granted patent claims in post-grant
29. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–39 (2015) (discussing
the tenets of patent claim construction).
30. That said, as discussed further below, see infra note 39 and accompanying text, to the
extent the PTAB uses a claim construction standard that differs from that used in Article III
courts, district courts may be reluctant to rely on the PTAB claim construction.
31. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 634–36 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1466 n.139
(2010); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 49–50), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [https://perma.cc/MJ7ENDC9].
32. Anderson, supra note 31, at 632–33.
33. Of course, enhancing PTAB power by making it an attractive venue to challenge
patents could be viewed as diminishing the power of another institution within the PTO—the
examining corps. Indeed, prior to the PTAB’s having issued many decisions, some
commentators had expressed concern that, out of solidarity with the examining corps and
concern for overall PTO prestige, the PTAB might be reluctant to cancel claims on granted
patents. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2013–14 (2013). At least thus far,
Wasserman’s concerns have not been borne out. More generally, large agencies like the PTO
are highly complex organizations, with potentially conflicting internal constituencies.
Administrative law scholars have recently begun to pay significant attention to important
divisions within agencies. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–18 (2006); Elizabeth
Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–38
(2011).
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administrative reviews is more attractive (because easier to satisfy)
than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard used in Article III
34
courts.
The AIA also directs the PTO to establish a cadre of expert
administrative judges who are required to process validity challenges
to granted patents in a short period of time (generally a year after the
35
initial institution). Expertise, resources, and quick decisionmaking
are valuable for the PTAB not only in absolute terms but also
because they enhance the case for district court stays of parallel
litigation. The AIA also delegates significant rulemaking power over
details of post-grant proceedings to the PTO. Specifically, for each of
the key post-grant proceedings, the PTO Director must prescribe
36
regulations “establishing and governing” the proceedings. This
delegation creates the potential for additional power transfer. So long
37
as PTO regulations do not contradict specific statutory language,
these regulations are constrained only by the requirement that they
reflect such high-level principles as “the effect of any such regulation
on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient
administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely
38
complete proceedings.”
Pursuant to this Congressional authorization, the PTO has
implemented regulations that have the effect of transferring power to
the PTAB. In certain cases, rules create power by making the
proceedings attractive to challengers. For example, PTO rules

34. Compare AIA § 6(d), 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2012) (requiring the statutory
“preponderance of the evidence” standard), with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct.
2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that challengers to granted patents must show “clear and convincing
evidence” of invalidity in Article III courts).
35. See AIA § 7, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012); AIA § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11),
326(a)(11) (2012).
36. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(2)–(4), 326(a)(2)–(4); see also AIA § 18, 35 U.S.C. § 321 note
(2012) (providing that the director “shall issue regulations establishing and implementing a
transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of the validity of covered business method
patents”).
37. Under conventional administrative law principles, when Congress delegates regulatory
power to agencies, the agency cannot issue regulations in contravention of clear statutory
language. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
In the case of the PGR sections of the AIA, certain statutory language is quite specific and
clear. For example, either party to a proceeding has a “right to an oral hearing.” 35 U.S.C.
§§ 316(a)(10), 326(a)(10). But the statute also employs terms that broaden the regulatory
authority of the PTO, such as “what is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.” Id.
§ 316(a)(5)(B).
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(b), 326(b).
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invoking an approach to claim scope known as “broadest reasonable
interpretation” (BRI) in the three proceedings creates greater
39
potential for claim invalidity than in district court. The agency’s
decision to allow preliminary institutions of review and final decisions
to be made by the same panel of judges may also enhance
attractiveness to challengers—on this view, judges who have already
40
decided to institute review are likely to find for the challenger.
To be sure, district courts are hardly passive actors in these
power dynamics. For PTAB petitioning to be most effective, the
district court must be open to staying concurrent litigation. In this
regard, the AIA language is not as strong as it could be. Although the
AIA does specifically direct district courts to use a standard that
41
favors grants of stay in CBMR proceedings, the statute provides no
42
such direction for IPR proceedings.
Nonetheless, in general, district courts have been reluctant to
deny stay motions. In the period since PTAB proceedings began in
39. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446); see also infra notes 51–62 and
accompanying text.
40. Of course, this situation has parallels in Article III litigation. A judge who has decided
to grant a preliminary injunction, for example, may be inclined to make a final ruling in favor of
the party that secured the preliminary injunction. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of
Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 800–02 (2015).
41. AIA § 18(b)(2). For purposes of “ensur[ing] consistent application of established
precedent,” the AIA also provides for immediate interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
decision regarding CBMR stays. Id.
42. The statute’s more aggressive allocation of power to the PTAB in the context of
CBMR proceedings may reflect a view, held by influential members of the enacting Congress,
that CBMRs encompass subject matter that should be outside the scope of patent protection in
the first place. This view was held by Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the
CBMR provision as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011. In his March 2011
Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer described business method patents as “the bane of the
patent world” and castigated the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (1998), to allow such patents. 157 Cong. Rec.
3386, 3416 (2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). Among many senators on the Republican side,
positions were equally strong. The Senate Republican Policy Committee’s summary of section
18, introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately)
that
[r]ecent court decisions, culminating in last year’s Supreme Court decision in Bilski v.
Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the patenting of business methods, emphasizing
that these “inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening years,
however, PTO was forced to issue a large number of business-method patents, many
or possibly all of which are no longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a
relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of invalid businessmethod patents.
Id. at 3420 (statement of Sen. Kyl).

BENJAMIN & RAI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE ERA OF PATENT STARE DECISIS

4/29/2016 9:48 AM

1573

September 2012 through the end of May 2015, district courts have
permanently denied in full only 25.6 percent of stay motions pending
43
IPR and only 20.6 percent of stay motions pending CBMR.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in VirtualAgility Inc. v.
44
Salesforce.com, Inc. states that district courts have very limited
discretion to deny stays when all claims asserted in litigation are also
45
under CBMR.
B. Power Relative to the Federal Circuit
Litigating at the Federal Circuit, the PTO has asserted power
relative to the appellate court in at least three major respects. First,
the agency has argued that it is entitled to Chevron deference for a
number of rules governing post-grant proceedings. These include
46
rules that designate the BRI standard for claim construction, that
allow decisions regarding preliminary institution of review and final
47
decisions to be made by the same panel, and that allow the PTAB to
48
institute a review on only some of the claims in the petition. Second,
the agency has asserted that the AIA effectively insulates the PTAB’s
preliminary institution of review decisions from judicial review, even
49
when the PTAB’s final decision on the merits is later appealed.
Third, the agency has asserted its prerogative to define the scope of a
CBMR proceeding and has also pushed the envelope in evaluating
challenges to patent-eligible subject matter within those
50
proceedings.

43. Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 8 (manuscript at 29).
44. VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
45. Id. at 1313 (“Under the statutory scheme, district courts have no role in reviewing the
PTAB’s determinations regarding the patentability of claims that are subject to CBM
proceedings.”).
46. See, e.g., In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446) (“Because Congress authorized the
PTO to prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed according to the familiar
Chevron framework.”); see also infra Part II (discussing cases invoking Chevron).
47. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
48. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., Nos. 2014-1516, 2014-1530, 2016 WL 520236,
at *2–3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016).
49. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office at 13,
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1194) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 324(e) to argue that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the PTO
Director’s decision to institute a PGR).
50. AIA § 18(a)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (“[T]he Director . . . shall issue regulations
establishing and implementing a transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of the
validity of covered business method patents.”).
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The PTO has repeatedly claimed Chevron deference for its rules
governing post-grant proceedings. In the first decision by the Federal
Circuit regarding a patent claim cancellation rendered under the
proceedings (in that case in an IPR), the PTO argued that its
rulemaking position on claim construction was entitled to the strong
51
deference available under Chevron. The Federal Circuit’s 2015
majority opinion in the case, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
52
LLC, agreed in part with the PTO. In its decision, the Federal
Circuit emphasized the PTO’s longstanding use of BRI in both pregrant and post-grant proceedings prior to the AIA, noted that
Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of such
convention, and stated that Congress implicitly approved BRI in the
53
AIA. But the court also discussed the new rulemaking authority the
AIA conferred on the PTO and concluded that, even if Congress did
not approve BRI in the AIA, the PTO’s rule adopting BRI was
54
reasonable under step two of Chevron. Similarly, the Federal Circuit
has relied on reasonableness under Chevron step two as an
alternative ground for supporting PTO positions regarding the
55
composition of institution panels and the selection of claims for
56
institution.
One aspect of the BRI controversy, over whether the agency’s
rulemaking regarding BRI represents “substantive” rulemaking and
thus exceeds its power, echoes prior controversies in which the PTO
has been challenged for allegedly exceeding its rulemaking power.
57
Most notably, in the 2009 case Tafas v. Kappos, the PTO faced a
challenge over proposed rules limiting the ability of applicants to
58
refile rejected patent applications as many times as they wanted. In
that case, as in the BRI case, the challenger argued that the PTO’s
rulemaking authority was purely procedural, with the term
59
“procedural” defined very narrowly. In response to the challenge,
51. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d at 1279.
52. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446).
53. Id. at 1277–78.
54. Id. at 1278–79.
55. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
56. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., Nos. 2014-1516, 2014-1530, 2016 WL 520236,
at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016).
57. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
58. Id. at 1371.
59. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Triantafyllos Tafas at 17, Tafas, 586 F.3d 1369 (arguing that
the PTO lacks statutory authority to promulgate substantive rules); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee
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the agency capitulated, and ultimately withdrew the rules limiting
60
refiling. Given the recent background of the Tafas case, the agency’s
willingness to argue that broad rulemaking authority allows it to take
an unpopular stance suggests some level of comfort in asserting
61
power. In fact, in its brief (unsuccessfully) opposing certiorari in the
Cuozzo case, the government argued that “nothing in the AIA’s
delegation of rulemaking authority limits the agency to ‘procedural’
62
rules.”
Second, in Cuozzo and other cases, the PTO has asserted that
the plain language of the AIA prohibits judicial review of PTO
decisions to institute post-grant proceedings, even when the agency’s
63
final patent validity decision is challenged on appeal. Like its
position on BRI, the PTO’s strong position against judicial review is
quite controversial. Indeed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
64
both the judicial review issue and the BRI question.
Third, the agency has been quite assertive with respect to the
highly contested issue of what constitutes a covered business method
(CBM) subject to CBMR and what constitutes patent-eligible subject
matter within these reviews. Section 18(d)(1) of the AIA defines a
CBM patent as “a patent that claims a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service, except that the term does not include patents for

GlaxoSmithKline at 14, Tafas, 586 F.3d 1369 (same). According to the challengers, procedural
rules were limited to those rules that had no impact on the ability to secure patent rights. See,
e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Triantafyllos Tafas, supra, at 22–25.
60. Dennis Crouch, USPTO Removes Rule Changes, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 14, 2009), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/uspto-removes-rule-changes.html [http://perma.cc/YC77-V3SQ].
61. In this Article, we do not take on the question of whether the BRI standard is the best
approach or even reasonable under step two of Chevron. Although the Congressional desire for
IPR and CBMR to serve as a substitute for Article III litigation, see supra notes 23–24 and
accompanying text, might militate in favor of the PTAB using the same claim construction
standard as district courts, Congress sent mixed signals by also providing an explicit statutory
mechanism for amending claims. AIA § 6(a), 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B) (2012).
62. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 15, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No.
15-446 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015), 2015 WL 8621635, at *15.
63. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446). Technically, the Cuozzo court’s decision on
this aspect of the case was limited to IPRs. Id. But the statutory language on which the court
relied is identical to that which applies to CBMRs and PGRs.
64. Id. at 1299 (reporting that five of the eleven judges on the Federal Circuit dissented
from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
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65

technological inventions.” Section 18 also directs the PTO to issue
66
regulations that define the term “technological invention.” The
relevant legislative history shows that Senators Schumer and Kyl (the
sponsors of the CBMR provision) faced opposition to a broad reading
67
of the term “covered business method.”
Even so, the PTO has adopted not only a relatively broad
definition but also a definition that gives the agency a fair amount of
discretion. PTO rules promulgated pursuant to its section 18
rulemaking authority to define the “technological invention”
exclusion state that the agency will consider on a case-by-case basis
“whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a
technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art;
68
and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.”
The PTO has also taken an active stance on the question of what
constitutes a “financial product or service” under section 18. Even
though Congress did not specifically order the PTO to promulgate
regulations, the PTO proceeded to promulgate a regulation restating
69
the language of the statute. In response, the agency received
comments stating that it should clarify that the term “financial
product or service” was limited to the products developed by the
70
financial services industry. The PTO rejected this proposed
clarification. In doing so, the agency invoked Senator Schumer’s

65. AIA § 18(d)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (Transitional Program for Covered
Business Method Patent); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014).
66. AIA § 18(d)(2); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b).
67. As discussed earlier, see supra note 42, Senators Schumer and Kyl were very opposed
to business method patents. The views of Senator Schumer and Kyl were not shared by all those
who voted for section 18, however. Other Senate and House members who discussed section 18
(both in support and in opposition) suggested that it would apply only to patents related to the
financial industry, as contrasted with business methods more generally. 157 CONG. REC. S9078
(daily ed. June 14, 2011) (reproducing a Chamber of Commerce letter, read into the record by
Senator Leahy, stating that CBMR provided “a tailored pilot program which would allow patent
office experts to help the court review the validity of certain business method patents using the
best available prior art as an alternative to costly litigation” (emphasis added)). In subsequent
floor commentary delivered in September 2011, immediately before the AIA’s passage
(commentary ultimately adopted by the PTO in its rulemaking), Senator Schumer was slightly
more modest, stating that section 18 was intended to cover activities “financial in nature,
incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 157 CONG. REC.
S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
68. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b).
69. Id. § 42.301(a).
70. Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered
Business Method Patents and Technological Innovation, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,735–36 (Aug.
14, 2012).
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September 2011 floor statement that the CBMR proceeding broadly
encompassed patents claiming activities “that are financial in nature,
incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial
71
activity.”
Within CBMR proceedings, the PTAB has also been aggressive,
particularly with respect to its interpretation of section 101. The first
CBMR proceeding appealed to the Federal Circuit, Versata
72
Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., involved a PTAB
decision to institute a review proceeding over objections by Versata
that its patent, which covered methods and apparatus for pricing
73
consumer products and services, was not a CBM patent. After
instituting the case, the PTAB then took an assertive stance on the
substance, rejecting the relevant claims as ineligible subject matter
74
under section 101 of the patent statute. The PTAB decision was
75
rendered on June 11, 2013, about one month after the Federal
Circuit’s famously fractured decision en banc in the patent eligibility
76
case of CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. and well
before any Supreme Court consideration of the case.
77
Essentially ignoring the Federal Circuit,
PTAB Lead
Administrative Judge Michael Tierney’s decision relied heavily on
two Supreme Court decisions that promote an aggressive view of
section 101 limitations—Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
78
79
Laboratories, Inc. and Gottschalk v. Benson. The decision cited
Prometheus for the proposition that a claim covering an abstract idea
is patent eligible only if it adds “significantly more” to the abstract
80
idea. Applying this Prometheus proposition to the case before it, the
PTAB determined that “determining a price using organizational and

71. Id. at 48,735 (citing 157 CONG. REC. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Schumer)).
72. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
73. Id. at 1311–13.
74. Id. at 1313.
75. SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, 2013 WL 3167735
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
76. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
77. The panel cites the Federal Circuit’s fractured en banc opinion in Alice Corp. only for
the proposition that “the Federal Circuit has recognized that it has been especially difficult to
apply § 101 properly in the context of computer-implemented inventions.” SAP Am., Inc., 2013
WL 3167735, at *14.
78. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
79. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
80. SAP Am., Inc., 2013 WL 3167735, at *14.
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product group hierarchies” is an abstract idea. It then cited
Gottschalk v. Benson for the proposition that implementation on a
general purpose computer did not add “significantly more” to the
82
abstract idea.
Similarly, the government brief in Versata on appeal to the
Federal Circuit—filed in May 2014, more than a month before the
Supreme Court had offered any opinion about section 101 issues in
83
the Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International appeal—
emphasized that the addition of a general purpose computer to an
84
abstract idea does not make the abstract idea patent eligible. The
brief also emphasized that a claim could be abstract even if the claim
85
were “highly specific.” For the latter proposition, the brief cited two
sources of support: Prometheus’s view that the “law of nature”
exception to patentability does not depend on the level of specificity
at which the relevant natural law is stated, and the fact that the
86
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos had deemed claims to be abstract
ideas even though they were drawn to very specific methods of
87
hedging against risk in energy markets.
As it happens, the PTAB opinion and the executive branch brief
were strikingly in line with the subsequent Supreme Court decision in
Alice. At the time, however, the approach the Supreme Court would
take was far from clear.
Throughout the Versata litigation, the PTO also defended its
prerogative to define what constitutes a CBM. With respect to the
88
CBM definition, the executive branch aggressively rejected
Versata’s claim that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction even to
review the PTAB’s determination regarding what constitutes a
89
CBM. The government highlighted the section of the AIA stating
81. Id. at *16.
82. Id.
83. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
84. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 51.
85. Id. at 52.
86. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
87. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 52.
88. Tellingly, the brief was filed by both the PTO and the DOJ’s Civil Appellate Division,
and a DOJ lawyer argued the case. See id. at 55. At the Federal Circuit level, DOJ lawyers
typically get involved when important executive power and administrative law questions are at
stake.
89. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
that the “USPTO devotes a substantial part of its brief to the argument that this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the Director’s decision to institute a post-grant review”).
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that PTO Director determinations regarding whether to institute
90
It argued that
CBMRs are “final and nonappealable.”
nonappealability applies not only to the issue of whether the
petitioner has made a threshold showing that “at least 1 of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable” but also to the definition
91
of a CBM patent.
Additionally, the government’s brief in Versata, invoking
administrative law principles of deference, argued that affirmance of
the PTAB’s determination was proper even if the Federal Circuit
92
were to determine it had jurisdiction. With respect to the PTAB
determination that the Versata patent was a “financial product or
service,” the government argued this determination was not arbitrary
or capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative
93
Procedure Act (APA). As for the PTAB’s determination that the
Versata patent did not involve “technological invention,” the
94
government invoked the Auer v. Robbins principle that an agency
interpretation of its own regulations should be upheld unless the
95
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent. Specifically,
according to the PTO, because the Versata patent employed a
computer only for generic functions, the agency’s determination that
96
the patent was a CBM met the deferential Auer standard.
At the Federal Circuit, the government’s arguments in Versata
were controversial, and some of them were rejected. The majority
opinion, authored by Judge Plager, rejected the government’s view
that the AIA cut off judicial review of a PTAB decision to institute

90. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 24.
91. See id. at 16 (discussing the PTO’s argument).
92. Id. at 12, 51–52.
93. Id. at 25. The government may have been disinclined to argue for the stronger form of
deference provided by Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), because the PTO’s actual
regulation with respect to what constituted a “financial product or service” merely restated the
language of the statute. Although Auer deference may apply even in that circumstance, use of
Auer under those conditions has been criticized by both scholars and judges. See Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (holding that “the near equivalence of [a] statute and
regulation belies the Government’s argument for Auer deference”). Interestingly, the patent
challenger, SAP, went further than the government, arguing that the PTO position was entitled
to deference under step two of Chevron.
94. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
95. Id. at 461.
96. Brief for Intervenor–Director of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 49, at 28.
(citing the Supreme Court decision in Auer for the proposition that agency interpretation of a
regulatory definition is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation”).
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97

review. Rather, he categorized the PTAB’s decision to institute a
CBMR as part of the ultimate invalidation inquiry made by the
PTAB, and noted that the AIA clearly gave the Federal Circuit
98
reviewing authority over the ultimate invalidation inquiry. Although
Judge Plager’s argument has vulnerabilities—as Judge Hughes noted
in his partial dissent, whether a patent is invalid is quite different
from the question of whether a particular institution has authority to
99
determine invalidity —the PTO’s muscular argument about
unreviewability certainly pushes against the broad presumption of
100
judicial review of agency action. This reviewability question is now
before the Supreme Court in the Cuozzo case.
The majority opinion in Versata did, however, agree with the
101
PTO’s position that the Versata patent represented a CBM.
Additionally, it embraced the principle of “substantial” deference to
the PTO’s definition of “covered business method,” noting
Congress’s “broad delegation of rulemaking authority in the
102
establishment and implementation” of CBMR proceedings.
Unfortunately, because the opinion did not precisely specify which
regime of “substantial” deference it was invoking, its value for future
decisionmaking by the Federal Circuit is not as robust as it could have
been.
Given the PTO’s invocation of administrative law in discussing
PTO control over CBMR coverage and its assertive actions in
interpreting section 101, the government’s failure to ask for any
deference for this interpretation of section 101 is perhaps surprising.
Similarly, in IPR appeals, the PTO has not asked for deference on its
103
legal determinations with respect to novelty or nonobviousness. As
discussed in Part II, the PTO has not asked for deference despite a
plausible argument that PTAB post-grant proceedings represent
formal adjudications. Thus, under the Supreme Court decision in
97. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
98. Id. at 1320–22.
99. Id. at 1337–43 (Hughes, J., dissenting in part).
100. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (stating that only “clear and
convincing evidence” can overcome the presumption of judicial review of agency action).
101. Versata, 793 F.3d at 1325.
102. Id.
103. Our research has found that, as of September 2015, the Federal Circuit has rendered
decisions from appeals of twenty-five final written decisions of the PTAB. To our knowledge,
the PTO has not asked for deference on legal issues concerning validity in any of these appeals.
Memorandum from Elliot Chen to Arti Rai (Sept. 21, 2015) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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104

United States v. Mead Corp., legal determinations made by the
agency in at least some portion of these reviews are entitled to
105
Chevron deference.
The agency’s failure to ask for Chevron deference on questions
of validity, or indeed on any legal determinations made in
adjudication (as contrasted with earlier rulemaking), is also puzzling
to the extent that the PTAB has been active not only in the area of
section 101 but also with respect to other important questions of
validity. As Rochelle Dreyfuss has recently argued, the PTAB’s
decisionmaking provides important suggestions for filling in gaps left
by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit on such central validity
106
questions as the definiteness requirement and nonobviousness.
II. FAILURE TO ASK FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE ON LEGAL
DETERMINATIONS MADE IN ADJUDICATION
As the previous Part highlights, the PTO has sought to assert
significant authority under the auspices of the AIA. This assertion of
authority has sometimes included taking a leadership position on the
legal standards that determine patent validity. So it might seem
obvious that the PTO would argue for Chevron deference on these
positions. But it has not so argued.
The most obvious explanation, and the one presented by John
107
Golden in this Symposium, is that the AIA does not give the PTAB
the authority to act with the force of law, so no type of PTAB
108
adjudicatory decision can receive Chevron deference. We disagree.
Mead held that Chevron deference applies when Congress gives
agencies authority to make decisions carrying the force of law, and
109
the agency acts on that authority.
According to the Court,
“[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and104. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
105. See infra Part II.
106. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015) (reviewing
recent CBMR, IPR, and PGR decisions and proposing ways of resolving the problems that have
arisen under the new AIA procedures).
107. John Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1655
(2016).
108. See generally id. (arguing that PTAB can still exert significant influence over patent law
despite not receiving Chevron deference under the AIA).
109. Mead, 553 U.S. at 226–27.
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comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
110
congressional intent.” Mead elaborated:
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
111
rulemaking or formal adjudication.

Mead emphasized that the touchstone is not whether an agency
specifically utilizes the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
laid out in section 553 of the APA or the formal adjudication
procedures laid out in sections 556 and 557 of the APA, but rather
whether agency processes have sufficient formality and rigor to give
112
them the “force of law.” Indeed, in a footnote following the
sentence quoted above, some of the adjudications Mead listed as
constituting formal adjudications did not meet all the requirements
113
that apply to formal adjudications under the APA. Accordingly, the
standard enunciated by Mead indicates that courts should consider
not whether a given adjudication has every element of the procedural
114
formality required under sections 556 and 557, but whether the
agency is conducting a procedure that is roughly comparable in rigor.
The PTAB decisionmaking processes meet this standard. They
have a fair amount of formality and rigor. The statute creating the
115
PTAB requires oral hearings, one of the hallmarks of formality.
Indeed, the PTAB statute goes beyond sections 556 and 557 by
116
requiring discovery. And the PTO’s implementation of the statute
adds to the rigor—for example, by prohibiting ex parte
110. Id. at 227.
111. Id. at 230.
112. Id. at 226–27.
113. Id. at 230 n.12; see Golden, supra note 107, at 1669–70.
114. The APA requires, inter alia, that there be a presiding officer (ALJ) who is relatively
independent of the agency and who has general control of the proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)
(2012). Parties are entitled to present evidence, present rebuttals, and cross examine. See id.
§ 556(d). And the ALJ’s decision must be based on the record. See id. § 556(e). The agency must
put its case into evidence and subject it to scrutiny, and the ALJ may not go beyond the record
in making its final decision. Id.
115. See AIA § 6(a), (d), 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(10), 326(a)(10) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(providing for oral hearings); Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 298.
116. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5); 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012) (not requiring
discovery).
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communications with PTAB judges and providing for cross
117
examination. Furthermore, as Melissa Wasserman has noted, the
statute’s “legislative history clearly shows that Congress understood
the Act to ‘convert[] inter partes reexamination from an
examinational to an adjudicative proceeding’ while establishing a new
procedure known as postgrant review that ‘would take place in a
118
court-like proceeding.’” The bottom line is that IPRs, CBMs, and
PGRs—the three PTAB procedures with which this Article is
concerned—have the indicia of rigor and formality that should satisfy
119
Mead’s “force of law” inquiry.
That said, for purposes of Chevron deference, formality and rigor
are necessary, but they may not be sufficient. A full analysis must also
consider whether an agency head needs to be involved.
In most agencies, formal adjudications are conducted by
administrative law judges (ALJs), and the ALJs’ determinations are
120
reviewable by agency heads. The ALJs find facts, make legal
121
determinations, and render decisions. The norm is that an ALJ’s
decision becomes the decision of the agency unless the agency head
122
reviews the decision and takes further action.
By contrast, as Golden notes, the underlying agency decisions at
issue in the cases Mead cited as examples of formal adjudication

117. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.5 (2012) (prohibiting ex parte communications); id. § 41.157
(providing for cross-examination).
118. Wasserman, supra note 33, at 1983.
119. In a predecessor bill, Congress did decide to delete a provision that would have given
plenary rulemaking authority to the PTO. But in our view that 2007 decision is largely
orthogonal to whether legal determinations made in the case-by-case PTAB decisionmaking
established by the AIA could have the force of law under Mead.
120. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ALJs are not officers because they do not render final
decisions); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”:
An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1489–90 (2009)
(discussing review of ALJs’ decisions).
121. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 120, at 1478 (explaining that ALJs
“handle matters in many areas of concern to citizens and society” and “adjudicate massive
numbers of individual disputes”).
122. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision,
that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there
is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule.”); see also 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (stating that an NLRB judge hearing evidence “shall issue . . . a proposed
report, together with a recommended order” which will become the order of the NLRB and
effective if no parties file exceptions within the statutory time period); infra notes 129–35
(discussing cases involving agencies in which decisionmaking is not reviewed by the agency
head).
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entitled to Chevron deference were affirmative decisions made by
123
agency heads. The agency heads made the final agency decision,
124
and that decision was appealed to the federal courts.
But these citations in Mead do not answer the question of
whether only adjudications overseen by agency heads and/or treated
as precedential by the agency are entitled to Chevron deference. The
125
touchstone is the “force of law” inquiry under Mead. Mead did not
address the question of what, if any, involvement by an agency head
or binding effect on the agency is necessary for an adjudication to
have the force of law. And the Supreme Court has not addressed
these questions in any subsequent case.
Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman have argued for a fairly high
bar: “An adjudicatory order should be understood to have the ‘force
of law’ . . . only if it is legally binding both inside the agency (that is,
binding on other agency personnel) and outside the agency (that is,
126
binding on the parties to the adjudication).” Thus, they suggest that
only decisions made or overseen by agency heads, and treated as
127
binding by the agency, are entitled to Chevron deference. Cass
Sunstein, by contrast, has suggested that adjudications that are
binding on the parties (as virtually all adjudications are) have the
force of law and thus are entitled to Chevron deference under
128
Mead.
These dueling interpretations of Mead are mirrored in a circuit
split on this question. In Olson v. Federal Mine Safety & Health
129
Review Commission, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Merrill and
Hickman and the agency’s rules (which provided that “[a]n
unreviewed decision of [an ALJ] is not a precedent binding upon the
130
Commission”), held that an ALJ’s decision was not entitled to
123. See Golden, supra note 107, at 1670–71.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
126. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 908
(2001).
127. Id.
128. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 222 (2006) (“[A]n agency
decision may be taken to have the ‘force of law’ when it is binding on private parties in the sense
that those who act in violation of the decision face immediate sanctions.”); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443,
1488–90 (2005) (suggesting that an agency’s “practical adherence” to a position is sufficient).
129. Olson v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 381 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2004).
130. Id. at 1014 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2700.72).
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Chevron deference “because the Commission did not review the
ALJ’s decision, and the decision is therefore not binding precedent
131
under the Commission’s rules.” Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held
that the dispositive question is whether the agency “‘intended to issue
132
an interpretation’ of a statute it enforces,” looking to whether the
head of an agency indicates that the administrative judge’s decision
133
(there, an immigration judge) creates a precedent for the agency.
And in another case involving the decision of an immigration judge,
the Second Circuit concluded that a summary affirmance of an
immigration judge’s opinion did not “contain[] the sort of
authoritative and considered statutory construction that Chevron
134
deference was designed to honor.” By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
in Florida Medical Center of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius afforded
Chevron deference to an ALJ decision that was not subject to higher135
level review.
Consistent with the position of Merrill and Hickman, as well as
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, Golden argues that ordinary
PTAB decisions that are not reviewed by the PTO Director do not
136
receive Chevron deference.
Golden’s view has some merit.
Although only about one-third of the total cohort of more than 250
PTAB judges hear post-grant trials, that fraction still encompasses
137
more than eighty judges. These judges, who serve on panels of
three, receive, and must make decisions on, approximately 150
138
petitions per month. To some extent, PTAB procedures resemble
the sort of uncoordinated decisionmaking process that Mead
identified as an indicator of decisions that lack the force of law. In
Mead, the scale of decisionmaking and lack of coordination were
more extreme: “[T]o claim that classifications have legal force is to
ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to
15,000 of them each year. Any suggestion that rulings intended to
have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year

131. Id.
132. Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hernandez v.
Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 839 n.13 (9th Cir. 2003)).
133. See Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006).
134. Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 189–91 (2d Cir. 2005).
135. Fla. Med. Ctr. of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2010).
136. Golden, supra note 107, at 1663.
137. PTAB, State of the Board Presentation on Allocation of Duties Among Judges (Jan. 11,
2016) (slide on file with authors).
138. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 4, at 3.
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at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting.” Mead’s
reasoning that Chevron deference is not warranted for the actions of
many different units not supervised by the agency head supports the
proposition that Chevron deference is inapplicable to routine PTAB
decisions that are not specifically supervised by the PTO Director.
But that is not the end of the story. The PTO has promulgated
guidelines for designating selected PTAB opinions as precedential
140
and explicitly binding on the PTO. The PTO’s guidelines provide
that any PTAB judge, the Director, the Deputy Director, the
Commissioner for Patents, or the Commissioner for Trademarks can
141
nominate a PTAB opinion to be designated as precedential. If the
chief judge considers the opinion an appropriate candidate for
designation as precedential, PTAB judges can then vote on the
142
question. Even if a majority votes in favor, however, the Director’s
143
agreement is also required.
This process would seem to satisfy the more demanding of the
two interpretations of Mead outlined above. The agency has created a
process by which PTAB opinions are precedential and binding, and
the process entails the explicit agreement of the agency head.
Notably, the PTO could change the guidelines in ways that would
make the fit under Mead even stronger. Specifically, the guidelines
could be revamped to require a rehearing leading to a precedential
opinion. A rehearing would bring in an additional source of legal
authority for the guidelines give greater authority to the Director, and
ensure that the PTO was in fact crafting a new decision (even if, in
cases in which the Director agreed with the original decision, it bore a
strong resemblance to the original one).
The proffered legal authority for the existing guidelines states
that the Director “has an interest in providing policy direction and in
creating binding norms for fair and efficient patent examination”
139. United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 223 (2001) (citations omitted).
140. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REVISION 9) PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND
DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL, at pt. III(E), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/sop2-revision-9-dated-9-22-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RCM6-6JAH]
(laying out procedures for the designation of PTAB opinions as precedential, and providing that
“[a] precedential opinion is binding authority in subsequent matters involving similar facts or
issues”).
141. Id. pt. II.
142. Id. pt. III.
143. Id. pt. III(D) (“No opinion may be precedential without concurrency by the
Director.”).
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144

under 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2) and 3(a)(2)(A). The latter provision is
more relevant, as it provides that “[t]he Director shall be responsible
for providing policy direction and management supervision for the
Office and for the issuance of patents and the registration of
145
trademarks.” But nothing in either provision explicitly gives the
Director authority to make opinions precedential. Such authority is
only implicit in § 3(a)(2)(A) making the Director responsible for
policy direction for the PTO.
By contrast, the patent statute explicitly grants the Director
authority to rehear PTAB decisions, and such rehearing authority
more obviously encompasses the ability to treat reheard cases as
precedential. Title 35, section 6 of the U.S. Code provides that “[t]he
[PTO] Director, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents,
the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent
146
judges shall constitute the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,” and that
“[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter
partes review shall be heard by at least three members of the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the
Director . . . [and] [o]nly the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may
147
grant rehearings.”
What sort of authority does this provision entail for the
Director? In answering this question, we are not drawing on a blank
slate. The Federal Circuit considered this precise question in In re
148
Alappat. This was a pre-PTAB case, and the relevant language
referred to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences instead of
149
the PTAB. However, except for the substitution of “Patent Trial
and Appeal Board” for “Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences”
(and the more lofty title of “Director” now given to the PTO head),
the language quoted above from 35 U.S.C. § 6 is identical to the
150
relevant language in Alappat.
144. Id.
145. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012).
146. Id. § 6(a).
147. Id. § 6(c).
148. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
149. See id. at 1531.
150. From Alappat:
In this case, the composition of the Board and its authority to reconsider its own
decisions, and the Commissioner’s authority over the Board, are governed by 35
U.S.C. § 7, which reads:
(a) The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of competent legal knowledge
and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the competitive service.
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Alappat held that this language permitted the Director to review
any Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences decision by creating
an expanded panel that consisted of the original panel plus the
151
Director and her top lieutenants listed in the statute. In Alappat, the
Director created an expanded panel consisting of the original three
panel members plus five new members (the Director, her deputy, an
152
assistant, and the chair and vice-chair of the board). These five
officials voted together to reverse the decision of the now-minority
153
three original panel members.
The lead opinion in Alappat
concluded that the procedure employed by the Director was
154
consistent with the statutory language.
To be sure, this is less control than would exist if the statute flatly
stated that the Director could individually review any PTAB decision
on her own initiative. But by changing the guidelines to focus on
rehearings and by relying on 35 U.S.C. § 6, the Director could give
herself greater control over PTAB decisions, both by being able to
rehear decisions (good and bad) and by creating an expanded panel
with like-minded agency officials. In other words, the Director has the
effective ability to accept, modify, or reject panel decisions.
In Alappat, the patent applicant raised a due process objection to
155
the procedure employed by the PTO. Although the objection was
untimely and the Federal Circuit opinion did not address it, we are
skeptical that interpreting the statute to give the agency head the
effective ability to review decisions poses a due process concern. To
the contrary, the Director’s ability to exercise legal and policy control
over decisions by ALJs is part of what Ronald Levin has called the
The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences.
(b) The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal
of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon applications
for patents and shall determine priority and patentability of invention in
interferences declared under section 135(a) of this title. Each appeal and
interference shall be heard by at least three members of the Board of
Appeals and Interferences, who shall be designated by the Commissioner.
Only the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the authority to
grant rehearings.
35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (emphasis added).
Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1531–32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1531–32.
Id. at 1536.
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156

“standard federal model.” Under this model, the agency head has to
be the final arbiter of legal and policy questions at the agency, and
therefore decisions by ALJs must always be reviewable by agency
157
heads.
As evidence of the Director’s lack of authority, Golden cites 35
U.S.C. § 141, which provides for appeal of a PTAB decision to the
158
Federal Circuit. In fact, section 141 also provides a right to appeal
159
to patent owners and applicants, but not to the Director. Depriving
the Director of the authority to appeal would be a startling omission
if the Director had no other way of controlling PTAB outcomes. But,
as Alappat noted, this omission seems premised upon the Director’s
160
authority to effectively review PTAB decisions.
With all that said, the most striking developments are the dogs
that have not barked. Thus far, the PTO has utilized its existing
authority to declare PTAB opinions precedential in only three
161
cases. Moreover, the decisions declared precedential in those cases
all revolve around questions of institution of post-grant proceedings,
162
which may be unreviewable in any event. This failure to declare
opinions precedential occurs despite complaints by the patent bar
163
that PTAB panel opinions on a number of issues are inconsistent.

156. Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch
Way, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 407, 412 (2013).
157. See id. at 413 (“Models in which administrative judges’ decisions may not be reviewed
by agency heads have been widely criticized in the literature.”).
158. Golden, supra note 107, at 1667.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2012).
160. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535:
One also should not overlook the asymmetry of § 141, which grants
applicants, but not the Commissioner, the right to appeal a decision of the
Board to this court. Since Congress has reenacted § 141 several times since
the 1927 debates about the Board’s independence, it is safe to infer that
Congress believed the Commissioner did not need a right of appeal in view
of his limited control over the Board pursuant to § 7 and in view of his
rulemaking authority pursuant to § 6(a).
(citation omitted). The powers to which the court refers in sections 6 and 7 are now contained in
sections 2, 3, and 6.
161. LG Elecs. Inc. v. Mondis Tech., Ltd., IPR-2015-00937, 2015 WL 9699396 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 17, 2015); Westlake Servs. LLC v. Credit Acceptance Corp., CBM-2014-00176, 2015 WL
9699417 (P.T.A.B. May 14, 2015); SecureBuy LLC v. CardinalCommerce Corp., No. CBM201400035, 2014 WL 1691559 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2014).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); see also supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Scott McKeown, PTAB Expanded Panels Are Not by Party Request, PATENTS
POST-GRANT (May 11, 2015), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-expanded-panels-are-notby-request [https://perma.cc/JHA6-XEPG] (“[G]iven the number of decisions issuing from the
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As for rehearing, although the PTAB has had rehearings and has
constituted expanded panels in some circumstances, the Director has
not utilized her rehearing authority for purposes of serving on a panel
164
and thus providing a decisive PTO determination. This inaction
occurs despite patent bar complaints regarding a dearth of
precedential opinions. And it persists even though declaring an
opinion precedential or conducting a rehearing or both would seem to
satisfy the more stringent requirements for adjudications to have the
force of law and thus be entitled to Chevron deference. The tools for
greater PTAB consistency and for Chevron deference, in other words,
are in the Director’s hands.
In our view, the limit to the Director using these tools is not
formal administrative law as such, but a combination of two factors:
the need to expend political capital in generating Chevron-ready
opinions combined with the possibility that neither the Federal
Circuit nor the Supreme Court will be receptive to arguments for
Chevron deference. We discuss potential political costs associated
with generating precedential opinions in Part IV. We turn next to the
apparent limits of administrative law within the patent system.
III. THE (APPARENT) LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In 2007, we wrote an article entitled Who’s Afraid of the APA?:
165
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, noting
that the Federal Circuit had not applied ordinary administrative
166
principles to patent law. In that article, we highlighted a 1999
167
Supreme Court case, Dickinson v. Zurko, in which the Court held
(contrary to the Federal Circuit) that the PTO was an agency subject
168
to review under the standards of the APA. We noted that despite
Zurko, the Federal Circuit largely adhered to its long tradition of
169
ignoring administrative law.
Since that time (as the discussion in Part I suggests), many judges
on the Federal Circuit have continued to be relatively wary of
PTAB, and the lack of precedential value accorded to the overwhelming majority of them, it is
becoming increasingly common to see directly conflicting opinions on legal issues such as
privity, real-party-in-interest, evidentiary issues, etc.”).
164. See id. (discussing expanded panels that do not include the Director).
165. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22.
166. Id. at 284.
167. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
168. Id. at 152, 161.
169. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 299–301.
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administrative law. Perhaps more notably, the Supreme Court has
been similarly wary. The Supreme Court’s wariness is striking not
only given Zurko, but also given developments in other areas that
some courts had treated as subject to a special regime—most notably,
tax law. For many years, a longstanding jurisprudence treated tax law
as an exception to ordinary deference principles, particularly in light
171
of National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, a preChevron case in which the Supreme Court had articulated a lower
172
level of deference to IRS legal determinations. But in the 2011 case
of Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
173
States, the Court squarely held that Chevron applied to tax
174
regulations. More generally, we now see significant momentum in
favor of applying ordinary principles of administrative law to tax
175
law.
Zurko and Mayo Foundation notwithstanding, recent Supreme
Court opinions in the patent arena have tended to reject standard
administrative law principles. These opinions have instead given
precedence to a forceful reading of the Court’s own pre-APA cases.
176
Thus, for example, in its 2011 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership
decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held that challenges to
PTO patent grants had to prove invalidity by clear and convincing
177
evidence. According to the Court, the 1952 patent statute, which
simply states that a granted patent shall be “presumed valid,” in fact
170. That said, the partial embrace of deference by the panels in Cuozzo and Versata, see
supra notes 54, 102, is notable.
171. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
172. Id. at 477; see Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration
in Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 492–
93 (2008) (describing the Court’s post-National Muffler jurisprudence); Kristin E. Hickman, The
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537,
1540 (2006) (noting that several experts on tax law have argued that Chevron deference should
not apply to Treasury regulations, based on “a belief that the tax area has its own, unique
deference tradition represented principally by the Court’s pre-Chevron opinion in National
Muffler Dealers Association v. Commissioner”).
173. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
174. Id. at 55–56. Notably, the Court’s opinion in Mayo Foundation relied heavily on
Dickinson v. Zurko. See id. at 55.
175. Indeed, two years ago the Duke Law Journal’s Administrative Law Symposium was
devoted to this very topic. See Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63
DUKE L.J. 1625, 1625–26 (2014); see generally Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher Walker, The
Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221 (2014) (arguing that the Tax Court
should apply ordinary administrative law principles to its review of the IRS).
176. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
177. Id. at 2242.
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codifies a 1934 Court statement in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
178
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (RCA) that clear and convincing
179
evidence is needed to overturn an issued patent. Moreover, because
of Justice Cardozo’s suggestion in RCA that clear and convincing
evidence was necessary even when the evidence before the court was
“different, at least in form,” from evidence before the PTO, the Court
in i4i held that clear and convincing evidence is necessary even when
180
the challenger brings forward evidence not before the PTO.
To our knowledge, however, although the legislative history does
181
talk about codifying an “existing presumption of validity,” it does
not cite RCA or provide any indication regarding the specific
quantum of evidence that the challenger must provide. Moreover,
although the Court in i4i states that the term “presumed valid” has a
182
“settled meaning in the common law,” and uses RCA as the basis
for this settled meaning, settled meaning may differ depending on the
Supreme Court cases to which one looks. As we noted in our 2007
article, many Court cases prior to the APA and since the APA have
enunciated the boilerplate view that the actions of all administrative
183
agencies are “presumptively valid.”
To be sure, in i4i, the SG—whom the Court often consults in
184
patent cases —submitted an amicus brief arguing strenuously that
185
Congress had codified RCA. The SG may have done so because
RCA offered a more bright-line defense of the past actions of the
PTO than the standard, APA-based approach. As we argued in 2007,
standard APA review would have counseled deference to the PTO
(probably under an arbitrary and capricious standard) only when the
evidence introduced in litigation had previously been presented to the

178. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934).
179. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2243 (relying almost exclusively on a close reading of RCA).
180. Id. at 2245–46, 2249–51 (citing RCA, 293 U.S. at 8).
181. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 29 (1952).
182. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245.
183. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 281 n.53 (quoting Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337
U.S. 86, 101 (1949)).
184. See generally John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 538 (2010) (tracing the increasing influence of the SG’s Office on
the Court’s patent jurisprudence since 1994, and noting that “[s]ince 2000, the Solicitor General
has enjoyed not only an expanded ability to help in selecting patent cases for Supreme Court
review but also an incredible winning streak in getting the Supreme Court to adopt its legal
positions in patent cases”).
185. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8–17,
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290).
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186

PTO. When evidence had not been presented to the PTO, there
would have been no prior PTO review to which the court could
187
defer. By contrast, the SG’s argument—largely adopted by the
Court—was a bright-line statement regarding the need for clear and
convincing evidence that was more likely to yield decisions to uphold
188
the patent.
But even in cases in which the SG has emphasized standard
administrative law, the Court has demurred. For example, in Kappos
189
v. Hyatt (a case in which the PTO was the petitioner), the SG’s brief
argued forcefully that standard principles of administrative
exhaustion and of deference to agency expertise precluded
introducing evidence in a patent applicant’s district court challenge to
a PTO patent denial that could reasonably have been presented to
190
the PTO previously. The Court specifically rejected the claim that
“background principles of administrative law govern the admissibility
191
of new evidence.” It relied instead on a 1884 Supreme Court case,
192
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, in which the Court had
suggested that the relevant provision of the patent statute established
193
proceedings independent from the PTO.
The Court stressed
Butterworth even as it acknowledged another case, Morgan v.
194
Daniels, decided just ten years later, in which the Court had stressed
the expertise of the PTO as a reason to defer to the agency in
195
rejecting the disappointed applicant’s arguments.
Of course, the reason that the Supreme Court is able to cite old
precedent is because the patent statute—and judicial interpretation
196
thereof—predates the rise of the modern administrative state.

186. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 22, at 319.
187. See id.
188. See Brief for Petitioner at 26–28, Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012) (No. 10-1219).
189. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012).
190. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 188, at 12–13.
191. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1696.
192. Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884).
193. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1698.
194. Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894).
195. See Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1698–99.
196. The rise of the modern administrative state is generally dated to the implementation of
the New Deal in the 1930s, or perhaps the Progressive Era and the New Deal, but either way
many decades after the Patent Act of 1836 created the Patent Office. See, e.g., William E.
Forbath, Radicalism and the Modern State: A Critique of Republican Nostalgia, 21 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 (2011) (“The Progressive Era and the New Deal were the decades that
witnessed the creation of the modern administrative state in the United States.”); Gillian E.
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Moreover, under section 559 of the APA, the statute does “not limit
or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise
197
recognized by law.” In Zurko, the Court held that pre-APA judicial
precedent (in that case, precedent regarding the standard of review
applicable to review of PTO fact-finding) was not sufficiently clearly
198
established to prevent application of the APA. Since that time,
however, the Court appears to have found clear pre-APA precedent
that contradicts traditional principles of administrative law.
A call for Chevron deference for substantive legal
determinations by the PTAB could entail a substantial departure
from the emphasis on stare decisis implicit in i4i and Hyatt. Indeed, to
the extent that the Court’s holding regarding Chevron deference in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
199
Services applies, administrative interpretations of the patent statute
could trump prior judicial interpretations unless those prior judicial
determinations held that the interpretation in question was the only
permissible one. Many commentators have recognized that, under
200
Brand X, deference trumps stare decisis.
Of course, i4i and Hyatt are only two cases, and they only
implicitly suggest that the Court will always be convinced of the clear
stare decisis effect of its own pre-APA decisions. In its 2015 decision
201
in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, however, the Court made
explicit its very muscular view of the role of stare decisis in patent
law. In Kimble, the Supreme Court declined to overrule Brulotte v.

Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between
Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 129 (2015)
(stating that “administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal’s
creation of the modern administrative state”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference With the Judiciary’s Structural
Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 66 (2000) (observing that the role of administrative agencies “changed
dramatically with the rise of the modern administrative state and its expansion during the New
Deal”).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
198. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155–59 (1999).
199. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
200. For example, Kathryn Watts has made this precise point in an article heading. See
Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997,
1013 (2007) (“Brand X: Allowing Chevron to Trump Stare Decisis”); see also Richard Murphy,
The Brand X Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1247, 1292 (“[The] duel between Chevron
deference and stare decisis arrived at the Supreme Court in 2005 in National Cable &
Telecommunication Association v. Brand X Internet Services, and the Court chose deference.”).
201. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
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Thys Co., a 1964 case that had rejected licensing agreements that
203
levied royalties after the expiration of the patent as per se unlawful.
The petitioner in Kimble had argued that the economic foundations
of Brulotte had been undermined and thus that it should be
204
overruled. The majority rejected that argument, holding that it
205
would not overrule Brulotte.
What is particularly interesting for our purposes is the degree to
which the Court viewed patent law as being relatively immune to the
possibility of evolution outside Congress. For example, Kimble
explicitly rejected the antitrust comparison:
If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might
answer [the] questions as Kimble would like. This Court has viewed
stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the
Sherman Act . . . . But Brulotte is a patent rather than an antitrust
case, and our answers to [the] questions instead go against Kimble.
To begin, even assuming that Brulotte relied on an economic
misjudgment, Congress is the right entity to fix it. By contrast with
the Sherman Act, the patent laws do not turn over exceptional lawshaping authority to the courts. Accordingly, statutory stare decisis—
in which this Court interprets and Congress decides whether to
206
amend—retains its usual strong force.

Notably, as Justice Alito observed in dissent, Brulotte “made
little pretense of finding support for [its] holding in the language of
207
the [Patent] Act.” The Patent Act had no language regarding
postexpiration patent royalties, yet Brulotte held that such royalties
208
were per se unlawful.

202. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
203. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407–08, 2415.
204. Brief for Petitioners at 36–40, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015)
(No. 13-720).
205. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. In doing so, the Supreme Court did follow the
recommendation of the SG. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720).
That is, as with i4i, the Court agreed with the SG’s view that the Court should rely on its own
precedents. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415; Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242
(2011). As we noted above, however, the Court rejected a contrary argument by the SG in
Hyatt. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012). In other words, the common thread in
these cases is the Supreme Court relying on its precedents, not deference to the SG.
206. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412–13 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
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IV. PTO POWER ASSERTION: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In this Article we have focused on two phenomena: the PTO’s
failure to place itself in the strongest position for receiving Chevron
deference, and the Supreme Court’s frequent reliance on pre-APA
cases that it views as definitively deciding the meaning of the current
patent statute.
With respect to the former, the PTO has underutilized the tools
at its disposal. Although the PTO already has guidelines for
designating PTAB opinions as precedential, it rarely uses those
guidelines. Moreover, the PTO has not established guidelines that
provide the Director maximum ability to review a PTAB decision and
oversee the final result. The benefits of such intensive involvement
are obvious with respect to PTAB decisions with which the Director
disagrees. And even for PTAB decisions with which she agrees,
formal administrative law would indicate that the extra steps involved
in making opinions precedential, in ordering rehearing, or doing both,
significantly increases the chance that the resulting decision will
receive Chevron deference.
For its part, the Supreme Court has in cases like i4i and Hyatt
failed to apply traditional administrative law doctrine. Instead, it has
adhered to opinions decided not only before the enactment of the
APA but also, in the i4i case, under an earlier version of the relevant
patent statute.
We believe PTO behavior is connected, at least in part, to the
Supreme Court’s approach. To probe further the contours of the
relationship, we posit three components of a PTO (and executive
branch) cost-benefit analysis on the question of Chevron deference:
the cost of setting up a Chevron-ready regime and implementing it in
any given case, the increase in the chance of receiving Chevron
deference, and the benefit of Chevron deference applying.
The costs of setting up a Chevron-ready regime vary to some
extent depending on whether the PTO wants to invoke its existing
system for designating PTAB decisions as precedential or do more.
Even within the existing system, the greatly expanded size of the
PTAB makes securing the requisite majority agreement of all judges
(including judges who do not handle post-grant proceedings) a
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challenge. By the same token, changing current voting requirements
to streamline the voting process entails its own costs, in terms of the
time and energy involved in such a change. If the Director wants to
give herself a greater role, and perhaps further strengthen the
argument for Chevron deference, the costs might be even greater.
Their precise magnitude will depend on the extent to which the
Director believes she will have to expend political capital in crafting
210
new guidelines.
We turn next to the increase in the chance of receiving Chevron
deference. There are three possibilities with respect to implementing
the existing guidelines, or modifying them to encompass rehearings:
first, any such implementation or modification could be unnecessary,
because ordinary PTAB decisions will receive Chevron deference;
second, it could be dispositive, because ordinary PTAB decisions will
not receive Chevron deference but those designated as precedential
or rehearings overseen by the Director will receive Chevron
deference; or, third, it could be legally meaningless, because neither
ordinary PTAB decisions, PTAB decisions designated as
precedential, nor post-rehearing opinions will receive Chevron
deference. Of course, reasonable minds can differ, but as a matter of
legal doctrine (and as we discussed in Part II) we think that the
second possibility is quite likely.
From the standpoint of the PTO, however, conventional
administrative doctrine is not the dispositive consideration. Instead,
the agency and its lawyers (both at the PTO and the DOJ) must take
note of the Supreme Court’s recent lack of interest (and the Federal
Circuit’s longstanding lack of interest) in applying conventional
administrative law principles in the patent context. The problem may
be particularly acute with respect to Chevron. And on questions of
Chevron, it appears that patent law may not be the only outlier. The
empirical work of William Eskridge and Lauren Baer suggests that
209. McKeown, supra note 163 (noting that precedential opinions are “next to impossible
given the requirement of a majority vote of all APJs, including those that are outside of the
Trial Section”).
210. As we noted earlier, supra note 33, internal divisions within an agency can be quite
significant. The costs of implementation of review by the PTO leadership should be relatively
low. The PTO leadership presumably already engages in some review of important PTAB
decisions as part and parcel of the Director’s leadership of the PTO. As in any organization, a
key role for the leader is to review the decisions of subordinates for conformity with what she
determines to be the organization’s goals. If rehearing were part of the Director’s review, this
rehearing could be translated into a new opinion fairly expeditiously, especially if the new
opinion agreed with, and thus built upon, the decision it replaced.
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the Supreme Court often fails to apply Chevron in many areas of
substantive law, even in the standard circumstance in which the
organic statute gives the agency rulemaking authority and the agency
211
interprets a statute under the auspices of this authority.
That brings us to the third component—the benefit of Chevron
deference. Full consideration of the actual impact of Chevron on the
deference accorded to agencies is beyond the scope of this (and
perhaps any) Article, but it bears noting that recent empirical work
on the impact of Chevron at the Supreme Court is not encouraging.
The empirical work of Eskridge and Baer suggests that, at the
Supreme Court, win rates under Chevron are lower than win rates
212
under seemingly less deferential regimes. The point about win rates,
standing alone, is not necessarily meaningful. It could be that agencies
are much more aggressive when they know Chevron deference will
apply, so the lower win rate in Chevron cases simply reflects agencies’
greater aggressiveness in statutory interpretation in those cases in
which they believe Chevron will apply. But those win rates, coupled
with the finding that the Court often fails to apply Chevron at all in
cases in which it is applicable, do seem to undercut the value of
213
Chevron.
As an alternative to seeking Chevron deference to decisions
made in adjudications, the PTO could seek indirect influence through
the SG. According to Eskridge and Baer, Supreme Court cases
frequently invoke arguments made by the SG, especially in technical

211. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1125 (2008); see generally Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,
89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011) (discussing various agencies for which courts appear to have created
agency-specific precedent). Richard Pildes, among others, has argued that differential judicial
treatment of diverse agencies is normatively desirable. See Richard Pildes, Institutional
Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5. For purposes
of this short contribution, we do not take a position on the normative question.
212. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 211, at 1142–43.
213. Indeed, if agencies cannot be confident that the Court will in fact find Chevron
relevant, then they cannot be confidently aggressive in situations in which they think Chevron
applies (because the Court might in fact not apply Chevron in such cases). If agencies
understand the phenomenon Eskridge and Baer identify, we would not expect them to be much
more aggressive when they thought Chevron applied, and thus the lower win rate in Chevron
cases would in fact reflect a deeper weakness in Chevron. And, even if agencies have not
internalized the phenomenon Eskridge and Baer identify, the inconsistent application of
Chevron, standing alone, diminishes its value.
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areas such as intellectual property. And win rates for the position
215
articulated by the SG in patent cases specifically are impressive. As
cases like Hyatt illustrate, however, the Court’s attachment to stare
decisis (or at least purported stare decisis) may trump even the
216
position of the SG.
CONCLUSION
The APA was a move away from ad hoc applications of
standards of review to consistent rules that would apply to all
agencies. And Chevron was a move toward rigor and consistency; not
only would agencies get more deference, but the law would be clear
as to when they received deference and when they did not. As is often
the case in law, the promise and the reality have been quite different.
And that difference has been particularly great with respect to the
PTO.
In the AIA, Congress not only gave the PTO enhanced authority
(to be implemented in the first instance by the PTAB) but also left in
place a statutory scheme under which the PTO could make a strong
case for Chevron deference. Yet the PTO has not pushed the levers it
has available.
Meanwhile, in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court rebuked
the Federal Circuit for failing to apply ordinary principles of
administrative law to the PTO, but since then has often found that its
precedents construing statutory language control, leaving no role for
the APA or Chevron deference. More generally, empirical studies
have found that the Court often fails to apply Chevron in cases in
which it is applicable.
In this Article we suggest that these phenomena are related—
that the PTO’s failure to push for deference may reflect a calculation
that the benefits of such a push will be fairly low, because of
uncertainty about the Court actually deferring in situations in which it
seems appropriate.
In the end, what appears to matter most is what the Court thinks
it has already decided. One can be forgiven for concluding that we are
operating under a regime in which the agency defers, and the Court
decides.
214. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 211, at 1140 (coding seven out of seventeen intellectual
property cases as involving “consultative deference” to the views of the SG).
215. See Duffy, supra note 184, at 538.
216. See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text.

